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In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Court held that 
individuals have a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms 
apart from their associations with state militias.2 Although that 
holding was and remains controversial, less attention has been 
paid to what the Heller Court had to say about the Fourth 
Amendment, which provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.3 
Writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia asserts that the 
phrase “right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment 
“unambiguously refers to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights or 
rights that may only be exercised through participation in some 
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 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition 
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense.”). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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corporate body.”4 The Court admits that “[i]f we look to other 
founding-era documents, we find that some state constitutions 
used the term ‘the people’ to refer to the people collectively, in 
contrast to ‘citizen,’ which was used to invoke individual rights.”5 
It nevertheless maintains “that usage was not remotely 
uniform. . . . And, most importantly, it was clearly not the 
terminology used in the Federal Constitution, given the First, 
Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.”6 
By any definition, the Heller Court’s musings about the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment are dicta.7 The question before 
the Court in Heller had only to do with the meaning and 
application of the Second Amendment. There were no Fourth 
Amendment questions presented and the facts did not implicate 
any Fourth Amendment issues. Not only were the Court’s 
comments about the Fourth Amendment in Heller dicta, they were 
irresponsible dicta. The Court neither asked for nor received 
briefing on the meaning of “the right of the people” in the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court certainly did not offer evidence in support 
of its reading of the Fourth Amendment or consider in any material 
way contrary evidence or the potential consequences of its 
interpretation. It resorted instead to the easy rhetoric of clarity. 
Thus, the Court’s broad claims about the Fourth Amendment in 
Heller exhibit more than just a lack of judicial restraint, they 
display a disturbingly casual association with basic rules of textual 
interpretation and legal argument.  
This is a shame, particularly coming through the pen of the 
Court’s leading textualist.8 It is also dangerous. That is because 
the security of the people guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment 
presently is imperiled by the rapidly expanding surveillance 
                                                                                                     
 4. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
 5. Id. at 580 n.6. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). 
 8. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997) (discussing Justice Scalia’s own textualist approach to statutory 
construction and how that approach works in a common-law system). 
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capacities of governments and their agents.9 Meeting challenges to 
security and privacy posed by these technologies will require a 
sustained investment in constitutional remedies capable of 
reclaiming and preserving that security.10 As Justice Scalia 
recently pointed out, although “dicta, even calculated dicta, are 
nothing but dicta,” “[d]icta on legal points . . . can do harm, because 
though they are not binding they can mislead.”11 This is certainly 
true of the Heller Court’s reading of the Fourth Amendment, which 
threatens the ability of courts to fashion and enforce those 
remedies, leaving each of us and all of us more vulnerable to the 
kind of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is anathema to 
the Fourth Amendment.12 
This Essay takes on the Court’s dangerous dicta in Heller. It 
does so on textualist grounds. By applying well-established canons 
of interpretation, and considering historical evidence, it argues 
that rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are fundamentally 
collective rather than individual.13 This does not mean that 
                                                                                                     
 9. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 62, 103–25 (2014) (“Although it has not squarely addressed the 
issue, existing Supreme Court doctrine exhibits considerable sympathy for the 
proposition that emerging technologies capable of amassing large quantities of 
information about individuals implicate Fourth Amendment bulwarks against a 
surveillance state.”). 
 10. See generally DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE (2016) [hereinafter AGE OF SURVEILLANCE] (arguing that 
guaranteeing the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against threats of unreasonable search and seizure posed by contemporary 
surveillance methods and technologies will require courts to fashion a range of 
prospective constitutional remedies); David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies 
as Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
[hereinafter Warrant Requirement] (arguing for a constitutional warrant 
requirement limiting law enforcement access to some surveillance technologies); 
David Gray & Danielle Citron, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Right 
to Quantitative Privacy (Mar. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter 
Remedies & Quantitative Privacy] (arguing for a constitutional right to 
prospective constraints on law enforcement’s access to surveillance technologies 
capable of facilitating broad and indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a 
surveillance state) (on file with author). 
 11. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing negative effects of 
increased government surveillance). 
 13. It is not entirely clear that the Court ultimately disagrees with this view. 
Just a few sentences after issuing its dangerous dicta, it adopts the more 
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individuals cannot seek Fourth Amendment protections or raise 
Fourth Amendment claims. Any right of the people must in some 
way devolve to protections for persons, after all. Rather, the point 
is that the Fourth Amendment targets search and seizure methods 
and practices, which, if left to the unfettered discretion of 
government agents, would leave all of us and each of us insecure 
in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.14 This is precisely what 
is at stake in governments’ use of modern surveillance 
technologies.15 
II. The Canon of Plain Meaning 
The first rule of textual interpretation is that words and 
phrases should be read for their plain meaning.16 Barring some 
evidence of technical usage, words and phrases are presumed to 
carry their common public meaning. When determining common 
public meaning, dictionaries provide a useful resource. Justice 
Scalia has identified several dictionaries as authoritative sources 
for common public meaning during the founding era.17 Among 
them is Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, 
which the Heller Court relies upon for founding-era definitions of 
“keep and bear arms,”18 and which Justice Scalia has hailed as 
                                                                                                     
defensible view that “the people . . . unambiguously refers to all members of the 
political community, not an unspecified subset.” Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 580 (2008).  
 14. See Gray & Citron, supra note 9, at 102 (arguing that unlimited access 
to broad surveillance power with low costs associated with use by law enforcement 
violates reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 15. See id. at 106, 112–13 (arguing that the quantity of data collected by new 
technologies, like drone surveillance, present novel and unique implications for 
the right to privacy). 
 16. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (beginning the analysis with the text of the 
Second Amendment); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 16, 30 
(2012) (emphasizing the importance of the plain meaning of text in statutory 
interpretation). See generally NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol.2A, 160–61 (7th ed., 2012). See also Scalia, supra 
note 8, at 15 (recognizing the authority of Sutherland). 
 17. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 419–24 (listing several 
dictionaries). 
 18. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (relying on the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s 
dictionary to interpret the text of the Second Amendment). 
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among “the most useful and authoritative [dictionaries] for the 
English Language generally and for the law.”19 
According to the tenth edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary 
of the English Language, published in 1792, “people” refers to “a 
nation” or “those who compose a community,” whereas “person” 
refers to an “[i]ndividual or particular man or woman.”20 As a 
matter of plain meaning, then, we should read the Fourth 
Amendment as referring to a right of “the nation” or “those who 
compose the community” rather than a discrete right of each 
“individual or particular man or woman.”  
Pressed, the Heller Court might argue that “people” is 
ambiguous, and may mean either “a nation” or “men or persons in 
general,”21 as in the phrase “when people say one thing, they do not 
mean something else.”22 Exploiting this ambiguity, the Court 
might contend that the best reading of the text is that it protects 
the rights of people, generally, which is to say “persons,” to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure.  
This line of response is fatally flawed. The mere possibility of 
an ambiguity does not by itself compromise plain meaning.23 The 
ambiguity must be plausible in light of other intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence. Moreover, even where there is a plausible alternative 
interpretation of a word or phrase, suggesting a real ambiguity, 
that raises rather than resolving questions. Thus, the Court would 
be unwarranted in concluding that the text of the Fourth 
Amendment clearly does not refer to the nation as a whole or the 
people comprising the community collectively simply because it 
could mean people in general. It would, instead, need to refer to 
some source of evidence to resolve the potential ambiguity. As 
subsequent sections show, all available evidence suggests that the 
text would have been read and understood in 1791 to mean what 
it says: that the right to be secure from unreasonable search and 
seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is a collective right 
of the people. 
                                                                                                     
 19. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 419. 
 20. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed., 
1792). 
 21. Id.  
 22. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 425–26.  
 23. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 33–41. 
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III. Noscitur a Sociis 
Closely associated with plain meaning is the interpretive 
canon noscitur a sociis, or “a word is known by the company it 
keeps.”24 This reflects the basic rule of all semantic systems that 
meaning is in part a function of context. “Lead” means one thing 
in the sentence “William Wallace will lead us to victory!” and 
something quite different in the sentence “Isaac Newton was 
obsessed with the possibility of turning lead into gold.” To the 
extent there is any ambiguity in the word “people,” we might 
therefore find some guidance by looking to semantic context.  
In defense of its claim that the Fourth Amendment 
“unambiguously refers to individual rights, not collective rights,” 
the Court might seek to exploit the fact that “people” may 
sometimes refer to a nation and sometimes to “men, or persons in 
general.”25 This effort might gain some traction if the text of the 
Fourth Amendment read, “The right of people to be secure . . . .” It 
does not, however. It instead reads,“The right of the people to be 
secure . . . .” Following the canon noscitur a sociis, we ought not to 
ignore the presence of that definite article or the modifying force it 
has on the meaning of “people.” 
“The” meant in 1792 what it means now. It is “[t]he article 
noting a particular thing.”26 Modified by “the,” it makes neither 
semantic nor syntactic sense to read “people” in the Fourth 
Amendment as referring to unidentified persons generally. The 
better reading, as a matter of plain meaning and noscitur a sociis, 
is that “the people” refers to a particular nation or community as a 
whole. In this case, that nation or community is the people of the 
United States of America.27 This has important implications. The 
Heller Court contends that “right of the people” in the Fourth 
Amendment “unambiguously refers to individual rights, not 
                                                                                                     
 24. See id. at 195 (discussing the canon of noscitur a sociis, in which one 
determines the meaning of a word by the words it is used in conjunction with); 
Scalia, supra note 8, at 26 (same). 
 25. JOHNSON, supra note 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Compare U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in 
order to form a more perfect union.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the 
People of the several States . . . .”).  
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‘collective’ rights or rights that may only be exercised through 
participation in some corporate body.”28 If the right to be secure 
under the Fourth Amendment was a right “of people” rather than 
a right “of the people,” then there might be good textualist grounds 
for this proposition. It is not, however. It therefore follows that, to 
claim Fourth Amendment protections, a litigant must be a member 
of “the people” in good standing29 and can only exercise Fourth 
Amendment rights through and by virtue of that membership.30  
It is worth a moment of pause here to consider one potential 
objection to all this close semantic and syntactic analysis. One 
might argue that those who drafted the Fourth Amendment were 
not thinking about these matters and were in fact rather sloppy 
during the drafting process.31 Accordingly, the argument might go, 
it would be folly to read the text too closely because that close 
reading may either imagine intentions that are not there or 
ultimately defeat the intentions of the drafters by privileging 
technicalities.32 Perhaps based on extrinsic evidence, such as 
legislative history, one might further argue that the drafters did 
not intend for the text to mean what it says, and that the 
interpretation more faithful to their purposes would read “the 
people” as referring to each individual person, subject, or citizen 
rather than the American nation or community as a whole. For at 
least two reasons, this argument must be rejected. 
                                                                                                     
 28. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008). 
 29. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006) (allowing 
suspicionless searches of parolees); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 
(1984) (allowing routine searches of prisoners’ cells). 
 30. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“[T]he 
people protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who 
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”). On this 
point, the Heller Court seems inclined to agree. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–81 
(defining “people” as all members of a political community, rather than an 
unspecified subset). 
 31. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 85–86 (2006) (suggesting that laws sometimes contain vague or 
ambiguous language for a range of reasons, including inattention). 
 32. See WILLIAM CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 602–719, 729 (2009) (raising the possibility that one might read 
intentions into a text that were not contemplated by the author); BREYER, supra 
note 31, at 98–101 (arguing that “an interpretation that undercuts the statute’s 
objectives tends to undercut the constitutional objective”). 
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First, it requires a shift of interpretive theories from 
textualism to intentionalism.33 As Justice Scalia has argued quite 
persuasively, intentionalism is a highly suspect enterprise that 
sets few, if any, constraints on interpreters while compromising 
fundamental democratic principles.34 The legislative record for any 
statute or constitution is bound to contain a range of often 
conflicting views reflecting the diversity of opinions among those 
who participated in the legislative process.35 Pursuit of legislative 
intent therefore presents judges with an opportunity to “choose 
their friends,” selectively highlighting legislators’ statements that 
favor the judge’s own views while discounting those which do not.36 
More fundamentally, the sources constituting a legislative record, 
such as floor debates, committee reports, testimony, and 
statements by legislators, are not subject to congressional vote, 
presidential signature, or, in this case, ratification by the states.37 
They therefore cannot claim anything like the democratic 
legitimacy necessary to rule a nation of free persons.38 For these 
and other reasons, Justice Scalia has argued that intentionalism 
is antidemocratic, and that judges who pursue legislative intent 
threaten to reduce us to the rule of men, not laws.39 Whether or not 
one agrees with Justice Scalia on this score, it would surely be odd 
to defend an opinion he wrote using methods anathema to his 
character as a scholar and jurist.  
                                                                                                     
 33. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 16, 23 (criticizing interpretive paradigms that 
aim to determine subjective legislative intent). 
 34. See id. at 16–23 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic 
government—or indeed, even with fair government—to have the meaning of a law 
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated.”). 
 35. See id. at 29, 36 (criticizing the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation). 
 36. See id. at 36 (“As Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look 
over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends. The variety and specificity 
of result that legislative history can achieve is unparalleled.”). 
 37. See id. at 32–36 (highlighting the anti-democratic implications of relying 
on statements not ratified by legislative bodies). 
 38. See id. at 9, 21–22 (“It is simply not compatible with democratic theory 
that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide 
what that is.”). 
 39. See id. at 22, 25 (arguing that formalism and a government of laws, 
rather than men, are inextricably linked). 
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Second, to argue that those who read and wrote the Fourth 
Amendment in 1792 did not mean what they wrote, but rather 
meant the exact opposite, would require compelling extrinsic 
evidence. The Heller Court does not offer any such evidence. 
Furthermore, as is set forth below, the historical context in which 
the Fourth Amendment was drafted and ratified supports the view 
that it means what it says, securing rights that are first and 
foremost held collectively by the people. 
IV. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius 
Another important canon of interpretation advises that the 
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the alternative. As 
the editors of the leading treatise on statutory interpretation have 
put the point, “when people say one thing, they do not mean 
something else.”40 The Fourth Amendment describes a “right of the 
people”41 not a right of “people” or a right of “each person.” As an 
intrinsic matter, that expression, which secures a right for the 
people as a whole, excludes alternatives such as “persons,” 
“citizens,” or “subjects,” which would secure rights for individuals. 
Moreover, relevant extrinsic evidence reinforces this reading of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
The Fourth Amendment was neither drafted nor ratified in a 
vacuum. Rights against general warrants and other abuses of 
search and seizure powers were already guaranteed to the citizens 
of the states by their state constitutions.42 Among these, two are 
particularly important: the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 
which provided that “the people have a right to hold themselves, 
their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and 
seizure,”43 and the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, which provided 
                                                                                                     
 40. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 426.  
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 42. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 561–73 (pointing out that 
drafters are presumed to know the relevant existing law). Although the Court 
does not acknowledge or address this evidence directly, Justice Scalia admits the 
relevance of evidence from founding-era state constitutions to the project of 
interpreting the Constitution. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 
n.6 (comparing language in the Second Amendment to that in contemporaneous 
state constitutions). 
 43. PA. DEC. RTS, art. X (1776). 
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that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”44 As William Cuddihy reports, the final 
text of the Fourth Amendment reflects a decision to adopt the 
Pennsylvania language rather than the language from 
Massachusetts.45 As a matter of expressio unius, this choice should 
guide our understanding of the text.46 
Selection of “the people” rather than “every subject” in the 
final text of the Fourth Amendment is particularly important in 
light of the role that John Adams played in founding-era 
approaches to search and seizure rights. Adams is widely regarded 
as the intellectual architect of the Fourth Amendment.47 His work 
on search and seizure for the Massachusetts constitution later 
served as a blueprint for the Fourth Amendment.48 Despite his 
influence on the overall structure and content of the Fourth 
Amendment, the drafters ultimately chose to use “the people” 
rather than Adams’s “every subject.”49 
At the risk of piling on, there is one more source of historical 
data supporting the proposition that the phrase “the people” in the 
Fourth Amendment was chosen to the exclusion of alternatives 
                                                                                                     
 44. MA. DEC. RTS, art. XIV (1780). The New Hampshire Constitution 
followed the Massachusetts model. See N.H. CONST., art. XIX (1784) (“Every 
subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of 
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”).  
 45. CUDDIHY, supra note 32, at 729. 
 46. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 4, 25–26, 429, 446; cf. United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990) (assigning significance to 
choices made by the drafters to use “the people,” “person,” and “accused”); SCALIA 
& GARNER, supra note 16, at 256 (acknowledging the canon of interpretation 
under which “[i]f the legislature amends or reenacts a provision . . . a significant 
change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning”). 
 47. See Thomas R. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 979–80 (2011) (“Most of the language 
and structure of the Fourth Amendment was primarily the work of one man, John 
Adams.”). 
 48. See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (linking early 
American concerns over searches and seizures to conduct by British colonial 
government agents prior to the Revolution); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1969) (“[T]he framers’ primary purpose was 
to prohibit the oppressive use of warrants, and they were not at all concerned 
about searches without warrants. They took for granted that arrested persons 
could be searched without a search warrant, and nothing gave them cause for 
worry about warrantless searches.”). 
 49. CUDDIHY, supra note 32, at 729. 
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such as “every subject.” The Constitution sent to the states for 
ratification in 1787 did not include the Bill of Rights. This was a 
primary concern during the ratification debates, leading several 
states to issue reservations with their votes.50 Among these were 
New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, each of which 
recommended that the Constitution be amended to protect, inter 
alia, the right of “every freeman . . . to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”51 Despite these suggestions, 
the final text secures the right of “the people.” 
Although the Heller Court does not acknowledge or address 
this evidence directly, the majority suggests a potential response 
in a footnote. There, it acknowledges that founding-era state 
constitutions sometimes used “the people” to refer to collective 
entities and “citizens” or some similar term to “invoke individual 
rights,” but suggests that there was insufficient uniformity, thus 
barring any clear conclusions.52 This is a helpful point, so far as it 
goes. It just does not go very far—or at least does not go where the 
Court might hope. 
The Heller Court’s reference to state constitutions is helpful 
insofar as it ratifies the use of founding-era documents to inform 
our understanding of original public meaning attributed to words 
and phrases in the Constitution. It does not, however, provide any 
assistance in support of the Court’s claim that “the people” in the 
Fourth Amendment “unambiguously” refers to individual, not 
collective, rights. At best, such inconsistency would show 
ambiguity, not an absence of ambiguity. It is more likely, however, 
that these differences do not reflect any ambiguity at all but, 
instead, reflect differences of opinion. 
                                                                                                     
 50. See A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (objecting to the federal 
constitution on the grounds that it contained no bill of rights, thereby denying 
citizens the ability to “plead and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as 
authority” in defense of “natural right”). 
 51. See generally Ratification Statement from New York (1788); Ratification 
Statement from Virginia (1788); Ratification Statement from North Carolina 
(1788). 
 52. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n. 6 (2008) (citing N. 
C. DEC. RTS §XIV (1776); MD. DEC. RTS § XVIII (1776); VT. DEC. RTS ch. 1, § XI 
(1777); PA. DEC. RTS § XII (1776)) (“If we look to other founding-era documents, 
we find that some state constitutions used the term “the people” to refer to the 
people collectively, in contrast to “citizen,” which was used to invoke individual 
rights.”). 
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The states may have had different views on whether, say, the 
right to trial by jury in suits regarding property was a right of “the 
parties”53 or “the people,”54 but that shows a substantive difference 
of opinion, not semantic inconsistency. One such difference in 
opinion was between states such as Pennsylvania and Vermont, 
which regarded search and seizure protections as rights “of the 
people,” and states like Massachusetts and New Hampshire, which 
viewed them as rights of “every subject.”55 The Fourth Amendment 
selects among these competing views. Far from showing 
ambiguity, that selection suggests clarity in terms of 
then-contemporary understanding of who held Fourth Amendment 
rights in the first instance: the people. 
V. The Whole Text & In Pari Materia 
The “whole text” canon holds that texts should be read 
holistically, preserving consistency in overall meaning and in the 
use of particular words and phrases.56 The closely related rule of 
in pari materia provides that legal texts should be interpreted in 
ways that preserve consistency among closely related laws and 
constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject matter.57 
Based on these canons, we might seek to resolve any ambiguity in 
the phrase “the people” as it is used in the Fourth Amendment by 
referring to how “the people” is used elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, 
                                                                                                     
 53. PA. CONST. art. XI (1776). 
 54. N.C. CONST. art. XIV (1776). 
 55. PA. CONST. art. XI (1776); VT. CONST. art. XI (1777); MASS. CONST. art. 
XIV (1780); N.H. CONST. art. XIX (1784). 
 56. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 204 (“A statute is passed as a 
whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and 
intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with 
every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole.”); SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 16, at 167–68 (describing the whole-text canon as calling upon “the 
judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the 
physical and logical relation of its many parts”). 
 57. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 234–38 (“When one section of an 
act deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with a part of the 
same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible.”); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 252 (“So, if possible, [a word or phrase] should 
no more be interpreted to clash with the rest of that corpus than it should be 
interpreted to clash with other provisions of the same law.”). 
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the Constitution, and contemporary legal texts. As we shall see, 
this exercise leads to the same results produced by application of 
prior canons: an understanding of the Fourth Amendment as 
protecting a collective right of the people.  
The word “people” appears nine times in the Constitution, and 
always as part of the phrase “the people”: in the Preamble (“We the 
People of the United States . . . .”); Article I, Section 2 (“The House 
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”); Amendment 
I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting . . . the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.”); Amendment II (“[T]he right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); Amendment IV 
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”); Amendment IX (“The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people.”); Amendment X (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”); Amendment XVII (“The Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof . . . the legislature of any State 
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary 
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election . . . .”).  
As the Heller Court admits, in all of these instances “the 
people” “unambiguously refers to all members of the political 
community, not an unspecified subset.”58 It further allows that, as 
used in the Preamble, Article I, and Amendment X, “the people” 
“arguably refer[s] to ‘the people’ acting collectively.”59 Contrary to 
the canon of in pari materia, however, the Court maintains that all 
remaining instances of “the people” refer to “individual right[s],” 
not collective rights.60 The Court does so on grounds of a proposed 
distinction between constitutional provisions that “deal with the 
exercise or reservation of powers,” where “the people” means what 
it says, and provisions dealing with rights, where “the people” 
                                                                                                     
 58. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
 59. Id. at 579. 
 60. Id. 
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actually means individuals.61 For several reasons, this effort fails 
to persuade. 
Foremost, there is no obvious distinction between powers and 
rights in the constitutional context. When the Constitution says 
that the people have the power to elect members of the House, it 
means that the people have the right to elect their 
Representatives.62 Likewise, when it reserves to the people powers 
not delegated to the federal government, it means that the people 
have the exclusive right to legislate and regulate in those areas. 
Reciprocally, when the Constitution guarantees the right of the 
people to assemble, to keep and bear arms, or to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, it reserves to the people 
powers to act on those rights.63 Given this relationship between 
powers and rights in the Constitution, it is unclear what, if any, 
mileage the Heller Court can get from claiming that, as it appears 
in the Constitution, “the people” is used in reference to powers in 
the Preamble, Article I, and Amendments IX and XVII, but rights 
in Amendments I, II, and IV.  
The Heller Court might seek to preserve its proposed 
distinction between rights and powers by suggesting that this 
alternative view indulges two fallacies: the naturalistic fallacy and 
the moralistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy maintains, falsely, 
that “is implies ought.”64 For example, the fact that many children 
live in poverty does not mean that they should live in poverty. So 
too, the Court might argue that when Article I says that the people 
have the power to elect their representatives this does not imply 
that they should have that power. The moralistic fallacy claims, 
again falsely, that “ought implies is.”65 For example, if one asserts 
that all people have a right to bodily security, it does not follow 
that all persons are actually safe or that they have the ability to 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. at 579–80 (“Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ 
attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”). 
 62. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2; see also JOHNSON, supra note 20 (noting that 
“power” may mean “[g]overnment; right of governing.”). 
 63. See JOHNSON, supra note 20 (noting that “right” means “power, 
prerogative, immunity, privilege”). 
 64. See Owen Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward 
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 894 (1999) (explaining the flaws 
inherent in the naturalistic fallacy). 
 65. See id. at 894–95 (explaining the moralistic fallacy). 
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keep themselves safe from physical threats. So too, the Court 
might argue that when the First Amendment states that the 
people have a right to assemble, this does not imply that they do, 
in fact, have the ability to assemble. On pains of either or both the 
naturalist fallacy and moralist fallacy, the Court might therefore 
claim that we must recognize a real distinction between “powers” 
and “rights” granted to “the people” by the Constitution. 
The problem with this line of argument is that it indulges a 
third fallacy: equivocation.66 The word “power” has multiple 
meanings. It can be used descriptively, as when we say that 
humans have the power or “ability” to reason.67 Alternatively, it 
can be used normatively, such as when we say that the state has 
the power or “right of governing.”68 The Heller Court is perfectly 
correct that when “power” is used descriptively, there is a sharp 
distinction between powers and rights. The naturalist and moralist 
fallacies capture that distinction. When “power” is used 
normatively, however, there is little, if any, distance between 
powers and rights—powers assume rights and vice versa.  
If the Constitution used “power” descriptively, then the Heller 
Court would have good grounds for maintaining a distinction 
between instances where “the people” is used in reference to 
powers versus instances where “the people” is used in reference to 
rights. That is just not how the Constitution uses “power.” The 
Constitution sets forth the de jure foundations of a republican 
democracy.69 As such, it does not describe and report; it prescribes 
and ascribes. When Article I vests “legislative Powers” in 
Congress, it does not merely observe the fact that Congress has the 
ability to pass laws, it establishes Congress and grants to Congress 
the right to govern by legislation. When Article II vests the “Power 
to grant Reprieves and Pardons” with the President, it does not 
                                                                                                     
 66. See EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO FALLACY-FREE ARGUMENTS 121 (2009) (arguing that walking a perceived 
middle ground between two opposed philosophies risks arbitrary decision making 
on the part of the decision maker). 
 67. See JOHNSON, supra note 20 (noting that “power” may mean “[a]bility, 
force, [or] reach”). 
 68. See id. (noting that “power” may mean “Government; right of 
governing”). 
 69. See BREYER, supra note 31, at 21–34 (explaining the nature and 
ideological evolution of American representative democracy). 
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merely report the ability of presidents to draft and sign papers; it 
grants to presidents the right to grant pardons. Thus, on pains of 
equivocation, the Court does not appear to have good grounds for 
distinguishing between reservations of powers and ascriptions of 
rights to “the people” within the borders of the Constitution.  
Absent some other grounds to distinguish amongst the 
Constitution’s use of “the people,” the canon of in pari materia 
provides further evidence that the Fourth Amendment should be 
read as protecting collective rights. Consider the use of “the people” 
in Article I, § 2, which provides, “The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the 
People of the several States . . . .” It would be absurd to read “the 
people” in this context as meaning “individual persons.” Doing so 
would afford each of us the right and power to select our own 
representatives. The better interpretation recognizes a collective 
right to select representatives. That is, after all, the whole point of 
a representative democracy. This does not mean that Article I, § 2, 
has no bearing on individual rights. It surely does. The right of the 
people to select their representatives implies the rights of 
constituent members to participate in the selection process.  
The Heller Court does not contest this reading of Article I. 
Neither does it contest the fact that “the people” in the Preamble 
and the Tenth Amendment refers to the people collectively. Given 
this, the canon of in pari materia demands that we also read “the 
people” in the Fourth Amendment as referring to the people 
collectively. As in the Article I context, this does not mean that the 
Fourth Amendment offers no succor or protection to individuals. 
The right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures implies the rights of constituent members to claim 
protection just as surely as the right of the people to select their 
representatives entails an individual right to vote.70  
                                                                                                     
 70. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 129–31 (citing the canon of 
interpretation that the plural includes the singular); see also  Camara v. Mun. Ct. 
of City and Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 527 (1967) (“The basic purpose of this 
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard 
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to 
a right of the people which is ‘basic to a free society.’”); cf. Dist. of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the 
people” in the Second Amendment describes a collective right, but “[s]urely it 
protects a right that can be enforced by individuals”). 
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The link suggested here between Article I, the First 
Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment may seem odd to the 
contemporary eye. For our founders, however, there was a clear 
conceptual connection among these rights that was reinforced by 
experience. The founding generation was influenced deeply by the 
political philosophy of John Locke.71 That influence is obvious in a 
number of founding-era documents, including the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, which wrestle with 
fundamental and timeless political challenges, and in the process, 
instantiate a people who claim some rights for themselves as “one 
Body Politick”72 and other rights for individual members of that 
whole.73  
This pattern of allocating some rights to “the people” and other 
rights to individuals is evident in founding-era state constitutions. 
Take, for example, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which 
recognizes the critical role of both collective interests and 
individual rights in the establishment of a just government.74 In 
                                                                                                     
 71. Donald Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional 
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 57–66 
(1985) (“It would be difficult to overstate John Locke's influence on the American 
Revolution and the people who created the government that followed it.”); see also 
The Proceedings Relative to Calling the Convention of 1776 and 1790 the Minutes 
of the Convention that Formed the Present Constitution of Pennsylvania, 55 
(1776) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Proceedings] (asserting that legitimate 
governmental authority is “derived from, and founded on the authority of the 
people only”); A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (objecting to the federal 
constitution on the grounds that it contained no bill of rights, thereby denying 
citizens the ability to “plead and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as 
authority” in defense of “natural right”). 
 72. Doernberg, supra note 71, at 59–60 (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise 
of Government, Sec. 95); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549–
50 (1875) (arguing that a government that exists by consent of members of the 
political community that has created it may exist, simultaneously, as both a 
government of “the States in their political capacity” as well as a government of 
the people themselves); Doernberg, supra note 71, at 62–66 (describing how the 
Framers of the Constitution relied upon the work of John Locke in understanding 
the interrelationships between citizens, the citizenry, and the state and pointing 
out the primacy of “the people” as a “collective body” in both Locke’s political 
philosophy and the constitutional framework of government).  
 73. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3 (explaining the rights of those charged 
with treason); id. amend. III (establishing protection against the government 
compelling the quartering of soldiers); id. amend. V (creating the grand jury 
procedure and guaranteeing due process); id. amend VI (providing criminal trial 
rights).  
 74. See Pennsylvania Proceedings, supra note 71, at 55. (“[A]ll government 
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keeping with that view, the Pennsylvania Declaration allocates 
some rights to individuals75 and others to the people as a whole.76 
There is a clear pattern to their choices.77 Rights assigned to 
individuals—such as the right to freedom of worship, the right to 
own property, and the right to fair criminal process—secure 
freedoms necessary to projects of ethical development and 
individual engagements with the state. By contrast, rights secured 
for the people—such as the right to hold elections, the right to free 
speech, and the right to assemble—comprise basic political rights 
essential to collective projects of self-governance.78 This reflects 
                                                                                                     
ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection of the 
community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to enjoy their 
natural rights . . . .”). 
 75. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I (1776) (“[A]ll men are born equally free and 
independent . . . .”); id. art. II (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to 
worship Almighty [God], according to the dictates of their own consciences and 
understanding . . . .”); id. art. VIII (“[E]very member of society hath a right to be 
protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . no part of a man’s 
property can be justly taken from him or applied to public uses, without his own 
consent or that of his legal representatives . . . .”); id. art. IX (“[I]n all prosecutions 
for criminal offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himself and his 
council . . . .”); id. art. XI (“[I]n controversies respecting property, and in suites 
between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury . . . .”); id. art. XV 
(“[A]ll men have a natural inherent right to emigrate from one state to another 
that will receive them . . . .”). 
 76. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. III (1776) (“[T]he people of this state have the 
sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police 
of the same.”); id. art. V (“[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and 
indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government, in such manner as shall 
be by that community judges most conducive to the public weal.”); id. art. VI 
(“[T]he people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to reduce 
their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and 
regular elections.”); id. art. XIII (“[T]he people have a right to freedom of speech, 
and of writing and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the press 
ought not to be restrained.”); id. art. XVI (“[T]he people have a right to assemble 
together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and 
to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances by address, petition or 
remonstrance.”). 
 77. That this choice should be afforded significance when interpreting the 
text is a matter of in pari materia. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 252–
55 (explaining the concept of pari materia and relating it to a series of decisions 
in which statutes were interpreted using the contextual meanings of related 
statutes). 
 78. This is a critical point missed by the majority in Heller, where the 
majority draws a distinction between uses of “the people” in the Preamble, Article 
I, and Article X, which “deal with the exercise or reservation of powers” and the 
First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, which deal with “rights.” See Dist. of 
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eighteenth-century understandings of fundamental political 
concepts such as “commonwealth,” “democracy,” and “republican,” 
as defined in relation to “the people.”79 
The U.S. Constitution follows this same pattern, resting 
Fourth Amendment rights with “the people” rather than “all men” 
or “every member of society.” This choice bespeaks an 
understanding that security from unreasonable search and seizure 
is linked to collective projects of governance and politics.80 This 
may seem counterintuitive to the modern mind. As the next section 
points out, however, this view accurately reflects eighteenth-
century experiences with search and seizure. 
VI. The Mischief to Be Addressed 
Although most textualists prefer intrinsic canons,81 which 
limit the range of relevant evidence to the text itself, courts often 
apply a limited range of extrinsic canons, which allow for the 
consideration of historical and contextual evidence.82 Among these 
is consideration of the mischief that a statute, regulation, or 
constitutional provision is meant to address.83 Evidence revealing 
                                                                                                     
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 (2008) (“Those provisions arguably refer 
to ‘the people’ acting collectively—but they deal with the exercise or reservation 
of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to 
‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”). 
 79. See JOHNSON, supra note 20 (defining “commonwealth” as “the general 
body of the people,” “democracy” as “a form of government . . . in which the 
sovereign power is lodged with the people,” and “nationalness” as “[r]eference to 
the people in general,” and “republican” as “[p]lacing the government in the 
people”); cf. Scalia, supra note 3, at 39 (recognizing the political dimension of “the 
people” as sovereign). 
 80. See Alexander Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1486 (2010) (“In this context, the move to 
the specific warrants required by the Fourth Amendment was a radical response 
to the English and colonial experience with general warrants, and the concern 
that they could be used abusively by the government to suppress pluralist 
political and religious discourse.”). 
 81. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 16, at 284–85 (“[I]ntrinsic aids 
generally are the first resource to which courts turn to construe an ambiguous 
statute.”). 
 82. See id. at 545–47 (“[C]ourts may also consider sources beyond the printed 
page. These sources from outside a statute’s text are known as ‘extrinsic’ aids to 
interpretation.”). 
 83. See id. at 461–66 (“All of these iterations of the rule about a word’s or 
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the mischief addressed by the Fourth Amendment reinforces the 
view that it aims to protect collective rights linked to projects of 
collective self-governance. 
Like many provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth 
Amendment was motivated by our forebears’ experiences with 
abuses of power.84 The Fourth Amendment’s principal bête noir 
was the general warrant.85 By 1791, the common law had rejected 
general warrants.86 Among the primary reasons English courts 
gave for this common law prohibition was the effect of general 
warrants on collective security.87 These courts reasoned that 
nobody could feel secure in their persons, houses, papers, or effects 
if forced to live under a regime where executive agents had the 
authority to engage in programs of broad and indiscriminate 
                                                                                                     
phrase’s meaning are the same in substance, reflect the idea that legislative 
intent is the ultimate interpretive touchstone, and should encourage conscious 
and deliberate judgment.”). 
 84. See TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 19 (arguing that the original 
understanding of the constitution can be found in the “pages of history the abuses 
against which the fourth amendment was particularly directed”). 
 85. See United States v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (explaining that 
opposition to general warrants in the colonial era was one of the driving forces 
behind the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 624–27 
(claiming that the debate over general warrants “was perhaps the most 
prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the 
oppressions of the mother country”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 601 (1999) (“The historical record, 
however, reveals that the Framers focused their concerns and complaints rather 
precisely on searches of houses under general warrants.”).  
 86. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) 
(“[The second clause of the Fourth Amendment] emphasizes the purpose to 
protect against all general searches. Since before the creation of our government, 
such searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.”). 
See generally CUDDIHY, supra note 49, at 439–40, 446–52; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342 (Robert Malcom Kerr, ed. 1965) 
(1769). See also Davies, supra note 85, at 655 (“Although there had been a long 
period in which general warrants had been allowed at common law, common-law 
treatises clearly disapproved of such warrants as a doctrinal matter (even if such 
warrants had not been entirely eliminated in practice) by the mid-eighteenth 
century . . . .”). 
 87. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“The principles laid 
down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. 
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court . . . ; 
they apply to all invasions . . . sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”); 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 366 (1974) (identifying the indiscriminate quality of general warrants as the 
principle reason for opposition in the colonial era). 
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search, limited only by their own unfettered discretion.88 Thus, in 
the General Warrants cases,89 which are widely recognized as 
signal events in the history of the Fourth Amendment,90 Lord 
Camden notes that, if a government can grant “discretionary 
power . . . to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may 
chance to fall . . . it certainly may affect the person and property of 
every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty 
of the subject.”91 Concerns for political liberty played a particularly 
important role in that assessment. After all, the plaintiffs in the 
General Warrants cases were dissident pamphleteers who were 
targeted by the King’s agents for their criticisms of George III and 
his policies.92 
Reflecting on this history, Tony Amsterdam has noted that the 
mischief targeted by the Fourth Amendment “was general, it was 
the creation of an administration of public justice that authorized 
and supported indiscriminate searching and seizing.”93 In light of 
this general threat, he concludes that “the phraseology of the 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966) (arguing that 
the “indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave 
constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and imposes a 
heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of 
procedures”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (“An officer gaining 
access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law . . . must 
then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would 
undermine ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects . . . .”). See generally Gray & Citron, supra note 9, at 73–83 (arguing 
that broad and indiscriminate data collection threatens to disrupt the balance 
between government power and individuals’ privacy). 
 89. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). 
 90. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (outlining the impact of 
general warrants on the creation and jurisprudential development of the Fourth 
Amendment); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626–27 (same); TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 19, 26, 
38 (same); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 772 (1994) (same). 
 91. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489; see also Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s 
State Trials 1029 (1765) (“[W]e can safely say there is no law in this country to 
justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all 
the comforts of society.”); TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 33–35 (recounting how 
members of Parliament and other elites felt threatened by the use of general 
warrants in the Wilkes case); Doernberg, supra note 71, at 57–58 (noting that 
“most eighteenth-century liberal doctrines can be traced to Locke and his concept 
that community power resides in the majority”). 
 92. TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 29–30. 
 93. Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 367.  
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amendment, akin to that of the first and second amendments and 
the ninth, [was not] accidental.”94 Bill Stuntz has reached a similar 
conclusion, pointing out that: 
Indeed, the real harm [illegal] searches cause, the harm that 
matters most to society as a whole, is the diminished sense of 
security that neighbors and friends may feel when they learn of 
the police misconduct. Totalitarian governments do not cow 
their citizens by regularly ransacking all their homes; the 
threat is usually enough. At their worst, illegal searches can 
represent such threats, sending a signal to the community that 
people who displease the authorities, whether or not they 
commit crimes, can expect unpleasant treatment.95 
So too has the Supreme Court, which noted in the Keith case that: 
Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in 
England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search 
and seizure power. History abundantly documents the tendency 
of Government—however benevolent and benign its motives—
to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its 
policies.96 
Those founding-era concerns have carried through to the 
modern era.97 Thus, Justice Jackson advises in Johnson v. United 
States98 that “[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a 
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom 
from surveillance.”99 More recently, Justice Sotomayor noted the 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 367. 
 95. William Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 881, 902 (1991). 
 96. United States v. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313–14 (1972). 
 97. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (“‘The security of one’s 
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.’”). 
 98. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 99. Id. at 14; see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) 
(“Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and 
through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently 
are guilty . . . . So a search against Brinegar’s care must be regarded as a search 
of the care of Everyman.”); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The basic purpose of [the 
Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment’s protection “reaches all alike, whether 
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close link between the Fourth Amendment and democratic liberty, 
pointing out that granting government agents unfettered access to 
contemporary surveillance technologies threatens to “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.”100 Collective interests have also 
played an important role in the Court’s exclusionary rule 
jurisprudence,101 which focuses on securing the general right of the 
people by generally deterring law enforcement officers from 
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures.102  
These historical and contemporary sources show that the 
objects of concern for those who wrote, passed, and ratified the 
Fourth Amendment reflect the scope and purpose of the text itself. 
The mischief they sought to combat was the licensing of practices 
and policies, such as general warrants, that posed a general threat 
to the security of the people. It is no surprise, then, that the final 
text guarantees a collective right of the people. 
                                                                                                     
accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory upon 
all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws”).  
 100. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 101. See Donald Doernberg, “Right of the People”: Reconciling Collective and 
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 273, 
278–80 (1983) (“The Court has substantially abandoned the judicial integrity 
theme and has instructed that the exclusionary rule exists not to vindicate 
personal rights of the victim of an unlawful search and seizure but rather to 
protect the collective interest of society in deterring fourth amendment 
violations.”).  
 102. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule should be to extend protection against the threat 
to the general liberties of the people posed by the central government’s agencies); 
David Gray, A Spectacular Non-Sequitur, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2013) 
(assessing and criticizing the degree to which the exclusionary rule is framed in 
terms of deterring government agents from invading citizens’ privacy); David 
Gray, Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary 
Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 8 (2012) (stating that the exclusionary 
rule was historically “designed to nullify violations, to prevent the government 
from benefitting by its wrongdoing, and to preserve the moral integrity of the 
courts and the government as constitutional torchbearers”); Doernberg, supra 
note 71, at 105 (“In the fourth amendment area, the Supreme Court has been less 
forthright about recognizing collective interests, but it has nevertheless done so 
in cases considering application of the exclusionary rule.”).  
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VII. Conclusion 
The majority in District of Columbia v. Heller asserts that 
“[t]he phrase ‘right of the people’ in the [Fourth Amendment] 
unambiguously refers to individual rights, not collective rights.”103 
As this essay has shown, this is simply false. By its language, and 
understood in its original context, the Fourth Amendment 
recognizes and protects rights held by “the people”104 against the 
government.105 This does prejudice the rights of individuals. As a 
conceptual matter, any right of the people is also a right of each 
person.106 All of us and each of us therefore have a right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure. Reciprocally, whenever a 
member of “the people” challenges a governmental search or 
seizure, she stands not only for herself, but for “the people” as a 
whole.107  
Taking seriously the collective dimensions of Fourth 
Amendment rights has important implications for Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, including the warrant requirement, the 
exclusionary rule, and standing.108 It also suggests ways that the 
Fourth Amendment can meet twenty-first century challenges to 
privacy presented by the increasing use of surveillance and data 
aggregation technologies.109 The true danger in the Heller Court’s 
                                                                                                     
 103. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
 104. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 105. See Doernberg, supra note 101, at 260 (“The two phrases, ‘the right of the 
people,’ and ‘to be secure,’ . . . imply that the amendment is a broad limitation on 
government; freedom from unreasonable searches is a constitutionally mandated 
social state.”).  
 106. Supra note 70.  
 107. See Alexander Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1487–91 (2010) (arguing that the effect of 
an individual unlawful seizure can have collective effects, such as decreasing 
community trust in the justice system and civic participation); Arnold H. Loewy, 
The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
1229, 1263–72 (1982) (arguing that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rules 
protects both criminals and the innocent by removing the incentive to make 
searches without warrants or probable cause). 
 108. See generally GRAY, AGE OF SURVEILLANCE, supra note 10; Gray, Warrant 
Clause, supra note 10; Gray & Citron, Remedies & Quantitative Privacy, supra 
note 10. 
 109. See generally GRAY, AGE OF SURVEILLANCE, supra note 10 (arguing that 
guaranteeing the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against threats of unreasonable search and seizure posed by contemporary 
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dicta is that it cuts off these conversations, threatening to hobble 
the Fourth Amendment when we, the people, need it most. 
                                                                                                     
surveillance methods and technologies will require courts to fashion a range of 
prospective constitutional remedies); Gray & Citron, Remedies & Quantitative 
Privacy, supra note 10 (arguing for a constitutional right to prospective 
constraints on law enforcement’s access to surveillance technologies capable of 
facilitating broad and indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a surveillance 
state). 
